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'TUCKER'S RULE": ST. GEORGE TUCKER AND THE
LIMITED CONSTRUCTION OF FEDERAL POWER
KURT T. LASH*
When Joseph Story published his Commentaries on the
Constitution in 1833, he dedicated the work 'To the Honorable John
Marshall," whose "expositions of constitutional law enjoy a rare and
extraordinary authority. They constitute a monument of fame far
beyond the ordinary memorials of political and military glory."1
Throughout the Commentaries, Story generously quoted Chief
Justice Marshall's great nationalist opinions in McCulloch v.
Maryland,2 Gibbons v. Ogden,3 and Cohens v. Virginia4 and used
them to construct a thoroughly nationalist reading of the federal
Constitution.' Along the way, Story seemingly dismantled prior
states' rights interpretations of federal power, particularly St.
George Tucker's theory of strict construction from his View of the
Constitution of the United States.' In writing his Commentaries,
Story sought to put the final nail in the coffin of the older "compact
* Professor and W. Joseph Ford Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I would like
to thank my fellow presenters at the St. George Tucker Symposium held at The College of
William and Mary Marshall-Wythe School of Law for their insightful comments. I am
particularly indebted to Michael Kent Curtis and Saul Cornell for their encouraging
comments and suggestions.
1. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, at iii
(Lawbook Exch. 2001) (1833).
2. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
3. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
4. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
5. See H. Jefferson Powell, Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution: A Belated
Review, 94 YALE L.J. 1285, 1301 (1985) (book review) ('The Commentaries were a massive
attempt to prove that the doctrines-nationalism, expansive construction of federal power,
and judicial supremacy-for which Story stood and which Jefferson had opposed were in fact
the logical conclusions of a truly republican faith.").
6. St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States, in 1 ST. GEORGE
TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION
AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH
OF VIRGINIA ed. app. at 151 (St. George Tucker ed., Lawbook Exch. 1996) (1803) [hereinafter
Tucker, View of the Constitution].
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theory" of the Constitution.7 Under compact theory, which viewed
the document as emanating from the several states instead of a
unitary "People" of the United States, any grant of power to the
federal government should be narrowly construed to preserve the
independence of the sovereign states.' As an alternative theory,
Story cited Chief Justice Marshall's "forcibly stated" opinion in
McCulloch9 and his own reasoning in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,10
which declared "[t]he constitution of the United States ... was
ordained and established, not by the states in their sovereign
capacities, but emphatically, as the preamble of the constitution
declares, by the people of the United States."" Instead of strict
construction, Story's reading of the Constitution called for a broad
construction of federal powers in order to best serve the (national)
purposes of the sovereign people of the United States.12
Story's Commentaries has been celebrated as among the most
scholarly and influential of the constitutional treatises emerging
from nineteenth-century America. In his magisterial The Marshall
Court and Cultural Change, G. Edward White devoted substantial
attention to Story's Commentaries and his dismantling of the
Jeffersonian compact theory of constitutional interpretation.
13
According to Nowak and Rotunda in their introduction to the
abridged version of the Commentaries, "[t]he passage of time has
vindicated Story's view regarding the basic role of the Constitu-
tion."'14 In fact, most scholars today treat Story's work as an
7. See 1 STORY, supra note 1, at 279-343.
8. See G. EDWARD WHITE, 3-4 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1815-1835, at 487-90 (1988) (discussing
nineteenth-century compact theory); see also H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding
of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885, 927-35 (1985) (describing compact theory and its
historical basis).
9. 1 STORY, supra note 1, at 400 n.2.
10. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 324 (1816).
11. 1 STORY, supra note 1, at 400 (quoting Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 324); see also
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,404-05 (1819) ("The government of the Union
... is, emphatically, and truly, a government of the people. In form and in substance it
emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on
them, and for their benefit.").
12. 1 STORY, supra note 1, at 406-07.
13. See WHITE, supra note 8, at 95-156.
14. Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Introduction to JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITUTION, at xiv (Carolina Academic Press abr. ed. 1987) (1833).
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exemplary and prescient source of early constitutional understand-
ing. As R. Kent Newmyer asserted, Story's Commentaries "were on
the winning side of history."1
Given the traditional status accorded to his treatise on the
Constitution, it may come as a surprise to learn that his efforts to
bury strict construction and establish a wholly nationalist reading
of the Constitution ended in failure. Even as he wrote, the jurispru-
dence of the Marshall Court was under fire, at one point compelling
the Chief Justice to publicly defend his opinions in a series of
anonymous essays. 6 Marshall's attempts to deepen the nationalist
reading of the Constitution first articulated in McCulloch, Cohens
v. Virginia, and Gibbons v. Ogden, however, caused a backlash in
state assemblies, who responded by proposing constitutional
amendments to cabin the seemingly unchecked power of the
Supreme Court. 7 By the time Story wrote his Commentaries," the
country was embroiled in a full-blown state nullification crisis, and
the Supreme Court had begun backing away from its earlier
expansionist reading of federal power.'9 Within a few years, Story
would find himself a lone dissenter, futilely invoking the ghost of
John Marshall as the majority of the Court moved toward a more
federalist vision of federal power and state autonomy. 20 Although
Justice Story would receive a final opportunity to reassert a
nationalist vision of the Constitution prior to the Civil War,2' the
15. R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD
REPUBLIC 195 (1985).
16. See John Marshall, A Friend to the Union, PHILA. UNION, Apr. 24-28, 1819, reprinted
in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 78-105 (Gerald Gunther ed.,
1969); John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, June 30-July 15,
1819, reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCcULLOCH V. MARYLAND, supra, at 155-
214.
17. See DWIGHT WILEY JESSUP, REACTION AND ACCOMMODATION: THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 1809-1835, at 194-261 (1987).
18. For reaction to the publication of Story's Commentaries, see Powell, supra note 5, at
1285. Story knew that his defense of the Marshall Court would be controversial. See WHITE,
supra note 8, at 100.
19. See, e.g., Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837); Wilson v. Black
Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 251-52 (1829); see also infra notes 221-45 and
accompanying text.
20. See Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 139, 153-54.
21. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 624-25 (1842) (rejecting as
unconstitutional state legislation that interfered with a slave owner's right of ownership).
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future of nineteenth-century constitutional law belonged to the
federalist rule of strict construction. Marshallian nationalism would
all but disappear from constitutional jurisprudence for the next one
hundred years, surpassed by the state-protective theory of constitu-
tional interpretation.
Today, the opinions of the Supreme Court echo the theory of strict
construction first presented in works like St. George Tucker's View
of the Constitution and James Madison's Report on the Alien and
Sedition Acts. Cases like Gregory v. Ashcroft, 2 New York v. United
States,24 United States v. Lopez,25 Printz v. United States,26 Alden v.
Maine,27 and United States v. Morrison8 all share a common rule of
interpretation: federal power must be narrowly construed in order
to prevent undue interference with matters best left under state
control. In the words of St. George Tucker, the Constitution "is to be
construed strictly, in all cases where the antecedent rights of a state
may be drawn in question. 29
22. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.LA Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873); Miln,
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 102; Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833); Wilson,
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 245. Other constitutional historians have noticed how Marshall's approach
to the Constitution seems to fit the modern era better than it fit its own. See, e.g., Powell,
supra note 5, at 1314 ("The constitutional vision presented in [Story's] Commentaries is a
curiously modern one.").
23. 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991) (upholding a state's right to establish age limits for state
judges).
24. 505 U.S. 144, 166-69 (1992) (overturning a portion of a 1985 congressional waste act
because it was inconsistent with the Constitution's distribution of power between the states
and the federal government).
25. 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (overturning the Gun Free School Zones Act because it
exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause authority).
26. 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997) (overturning background-check requirement of the Brady Act
because it intruded on state sovereignty).
27. 527 U.S. 706, 712-13 (1999) (holding that Congress may not force state courts to hear
cases from which they are immune under the Eleventh Amendment).
28. 529 U.S. 598, 607-13 (2000) (holding that the Commerce Clause does not govern
gender-motivated crimes of violence).
29. Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 6, ed. app. at 151. Neither has Tucker's
compact theory of the Constitution disappeared from view. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 850 n.2 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that states may not
alter congressional qualifications set forth in the Constitution); see also David Thomas Konig,
St. George Tucker and the Limits of States' Rights Constitutionalism: Understanding the
Federal Compact in the Early Republic, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1279 (2006) (reevaluating the
conventional portrayal of Tucker's understanding of the federal compact). Although the most
1346
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While the Supreme Court's current narrow construction of federal
power appears to be built on the Tenth Amendment,' ° its approach
goes well beyond that Amendment's simple declaration that all
powers not delegated are reserved. The fact that all nondelegated
powers are reserved tells us nothing about how broadly to interpret
those powers that are delegated.3 ' The apparent lack of textual
justification for the Rehnquist Court's rule of narrow construction
has provided fodder for critics of the Court's federalism jurispru-
dence." Even Justice O'Connor conceded that the Tenth Amend-
ment more suggests than demands the Court's federalist rule of
construction. 3 Her concession seems to vindicate Justice Oliver
recent decisions of the Court might seem to limit the potential impact of cases like Morrison
and Lopez, the Court continues to follow the principle of limited federal power articulated in
those cases. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2209-16 (2005) (upholding federal
power to prohibit state-authorized noncommercial use of marijuana for medicinal purposes);
Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1984-92 (2004) (upholding federal power to require states
to provide handicapped access to state courts).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people."). According to Justice O'Connor in the seminal "Federalism Revolution" case,
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991),
[t]he Constitution created a Federal Government of limited powers. "The powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." The States
thus retain substantial sovereign authority under our constitutional system. As
James Madison put it: "The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to
the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the
State governments are numerous and indefinite.... The powers reserved to the
several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of
affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal
order, improvement, and prosperity of the State."
Id. at 457-58 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961)).
31. As the Supreme Court noted in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941), "[t]lhe
amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered."
32. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT
SIDES WITH THE STATES 151-52 (2002); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the
Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 287-93 (2000); H. Geoffrey
Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a Judicially Enforceable Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV.
849, 850-51 (1999); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 903-09 (1994).
33. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992) (O'Connor, J.)
The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress, but this limit
is not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself.... Instead, the Tenth
Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject to
limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States.
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Wendell Holmes's derisive comment that limiting federal power to
preserve state autonomy seems to be based on "some invisible
radiation from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment. 4
St. George Tucker, however, would have vigorously rejected this
criticism.35 To him, strict construction provided not only the best
reading of a document that owed its very existence to the people of
the several states; such a reading was positively demanded by its
text." Any reading of federal power that unduly interfered with
local self-government violated the people's retained rights as
declared by the Necessary and Proper Clause, as well as the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments.37 Tucker shared this federalist reading of
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments with both the amendments'
author, James Madison, and Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story.3
Although the original federalist understanding of the Ninth
Amendment has been forgotten (until recently),39 it played a key
role in St. George Tucker's explanation of why the Constitution
demands strict construction of federal power. Often associated today
with attempts to deny individual rights, political players in Tucker's
day asserted the rule of strict construction to oppose the Alien and
Sedition Acts and, as the national struggle over slavery deepened,
the Fugitive Slave Act (albeit unsuccessfully).4 ° In fact, throughout
the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments jointly served to preserve the people's retained right
Id.; see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 585 (1985) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) ("The spirit of the Tenth Amendment, of course, is that the States will retain
their integrity in a system in which the laws of the United States are nevertheless supreme.").
34. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920).
35. See infra Part II.A.
36. See infra Part II.A.
37. See infra Part II.A.
38. See infra Part II.A.
39. For a discussion of newly uncovered historical evidence regarding the Ninth
Amendment, see Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Jurisprudence of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 597 (2005) [hereinafter Lash, Lost Jurisprudence] and Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original
Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 331 (2004) [hereinafter Lash, Original
Meaning].
40. See, e.g., Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 600-02 (1842) (reproducing the
argument of Pennsylvania's Attorney General, Ovid F. Johnson, who claimed that in the
context of slavery the Ninth and Tenth Amendments called for a limited reading of federal
power that preserved the retained powers of the states).
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to local self-government.4 Although the rule of strict construction
lost judicial support during the New Deal, it reappeared in the
federalist jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court.42 Most recently,
federal courts have strictly construed federal power in order to
preserve the right of Californians to authorize medicinal use of
marijuana 43 and the right to physician-assisted suicide."' Thus, the
time seems ripe for a reassessment of the textual and historical
roots of the rule of strict construction and its first scholarly
articulation in St. George Tucker's View of the Constitution.
I begin by exploring the textual roots of Tucker's rule, focusing
on the drafting, adoption, and early application of the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments. Next, I discuss the most serious challenges
to Tucker's rule: John Marshall's nationalist reading of the
Constitution and Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution.
The penultimate section looks at the rollback of Marshallian
nationalism and the restoration of the rule of strict construction
that occurred when Chief Justice Taney took the reins of the
Supreme Court. The Article concludes with an acknowledgment of
the remarkable longevity of Tucker's Rule.
I. THE RULE OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION
In the appendix to his edition of Blackstone's Commentaries, St.
George Tucker added a series of essays on American constitutional
law.4" There, he confronted one of the critical constitutional issues
in the first republic-the proper rules of constitutional interpreta-
tion.46 Nationalists, like Alexander Hamilton, read the Constitution
as emanating from a unitary mass known as the People of the
41. See infra text accompanying notes 240-47.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 248-52.
43. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1229 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom., Gonzales v.
Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
44. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2004), aff'd sub nom., Gonzales v.
Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904 (2006).
45. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (St. George Tucker ed., Lawbook Exch. 1996) (1803)
[hereinafter TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES].
46. See, e.g., Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 6, ed. app. at 140 (analyzing the
proper rules for interpreting the U.S. Constitution).
2006] 1349
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United States. 4' Tucker, on the other hand, saw the Constitution as
a compact entered into by the independent sovereign people of the
several states.4 s On this singular distinction turned the issue of how
to construe delegated federal power. As independent sovereigns, any
agreements entered into by the states should be read with the
presumption that the states retained their sovereign powers in all
matters not expressly delegated to the federal government. To
Tucker, the Constitution itself affirmatively established this
presumption and the rule of strict construction through the adoption
of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
Whether this original compact be considered as merely federal,
or social, and national, it is that instrument by which power is
created on the one hand, and obedience exacted on the other. As
federal it is to be construed strictly, in all cases where the
antecedent rights of a state may be drawn into question [citing
the Tenth Amendment]; as a social compact it ought likewise to
receive the same strict construction, wherever the right of
personal liberty, of personal security, or of private property may
become the subject of dispute; because every person whose
liberty or property was thereby rendered subject to the new
government, was antecedently a member of a civil society to
whose regulations he had submitted himself, and under whose
authority and protection he still remains, in all cases not
expressly submitted to the new government [citing the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments].49
Tucker believed the Ninth and Tenth Amendments worked
together as co-guardians of a federalism-based concept of popular
sovereignty." The Tenth Amendment guarded the people(s) of the
47. See Larry D. Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 642 n.126 (1999).
48. Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 6, ed. app. at 151.
49. Id. ed. app. at 151. Tucker also believed the Necessary and Proper Clause called for
a limited reading of federal power. See Woodson v. Randolph (Va. Gen. Ct. 1800) (Tucker, J.)
(unpublished opinion on file at the Huntington Research Library, Randolph-Tucker Family
Papers, Part I, mssBR Box 6 (26b)); see also Charles F. Hobson, St. George Tucker's Law
Papers, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1275-76 & n.217 (2006) (describing Tucker's
unpublished minority opinion, which gave an expansive reading of the powers reserved to the
states); infra note 155.
50. See Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NoTRE DAME L. REV.
429, 441-42 (2004).
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several states by ensuring federal power had none but delegated
powers.5' The Ninth Amendment ensured that the powers that were
delegated would not be construed to extend to matters the people
left to independent state control.52 Together, the amendments
guaranteed "that the powers delegated to the federal government,
are, in all cases, to receive the most strict construction that the
instrument will bear, where the rights of a state or of the people,
either collectively, or individually, may be drawn in question."53
Tucker was not the first to describe the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments as dual guardians of a federalist Constitution. Despite
the pervasive modern view of the Ninth as an expression of
unenumerated individual rights,54 both the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments have their roots in the state ratification conventions,
which called for provisions expressly limiting the construction
of federal power to preserve the autonomy of the states. 5 To
51. Lash, Original Meaning, supra note 39, at 398-99.
52. Id.
53. Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 6, ed. app. at 154.
54. See CALVIN R. MASSEY, SILENT RIGHTS 213 (1995) ("The Ninth Amendment provides
the best textual justification for recognition of unenumerated rights."); Randy E. Barnett,
Introduction to THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE
NINTH AMENDMENT 41 (Randy Barnett ed., 1989) [hereinafter THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE
PEOPLE] ("Mhe Ninth Amendment can be viewed as establishing a general constitutional
presumption in favor of individual liberty.... [The unenumerated rights of the Ninth
Amendment that protect individual liberty operate identically to enumerated rights.");
Thomas C. Grey, The Original Understanding and the Unwritten Constitution, in TOWARD A
MORE PERFECT UNION: SIx ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION 145, 162-67 (Neil L. York ed., 1988);
John P. Kaminski, Restoring the Declaration of Independence: Natural Rights and the Ninth
Amendment, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A LIVELY HERITAGE 141, 150 (John Kukla ed., 1987)
("(Tihe Ninth Amendment stands as a silent sentinel guarding liberties not otherwise named
in the Constitution."); Lawrence G. Sager, You Can Raise the First, Hide Behind the Fourth,
and Plead the Fifth. But What on Earth Can You Do with the Ninth Amendment?, 64 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 239, 240 (1988) ("Ihe amendment announces that there are valid claims of
constitutional right which are not explicitly manifest in the liberty-bearing provisions of the
Constitution but which enjoy the same status as do those made explicit in the text."); Suzanna
Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1166 (1987) ("[B]oth
the ninth amendment itself and the debates over other amendments confirm that the
founding generation envisioned natural rights beyond those protected by the first eight
amendments.... [Tihe framers of the Bill of Rights did not expect the Constitution to be read
as the sole source of fundamental law.").
55. For a comprehensive account of newly discovered historical evidence regarding the
federalist roots of the Ninth Amendment, see Lash, Original Meaning, supra note 39, and
Lash, Lost Jurisprudence, supra note 39.
2006] 1351
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appreciate the full import of Tucker's textually mandated Rule of
Construction then, we must revisit the Founding.
A. The Origins of the Rule of Strict Construction51
Given that the thirteen "[flree and [i]ndependent""v states had
existed for more than a decade under the Articles of Confederation,
a major issue in the ratification debates inevitably concerned the
degree to which the proposed Constitution would diminish (or
eradicate) the autonomy of the states.58 Despite Federalist assur-
ances to the contrary, Anti-Federalists warned against the potential
consolidation of the states under a national government with
unlimited power.59
Although a sufficient number of states eventually ratified the
Constitution, a number of them did so with the understanding that
the scope of federal power would be strictly limited.' Several state
conventions included statements of principle along with their notice
of ratification declaring their understanding that all nondelegated
powers were reserved to the states."' The New York Convention's
proposed amendments, for example, declared:
[Tihat every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by the
said Constitution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United
States, or the departments of the government thereof, remains
to the people of the several states, or to their respective state
governments, to whom they may have granted the same;
and that those clauses in the said Constitution, which declare
that Congress shall not have or exercise certain powers, do not
56. Some of the material in this section derives from Kurt T. Lash, Madison's "Celebrated
Report"of 1800: Transformation of the Tenth Amendment, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 165 (2006).
57. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776); see also GORDON S. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 356 (1969) (describing how the
states "jealously guarded their independence and sovereignty").
58. See WOOD, supra note 57, at 532-36.
59. See generally SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE
DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788-1828 (1999) (discussing Anti-Federalist thought).
60. See, e.g., Amendments to the United States Constitution Proposed by State
Ratification Conventions: Massachusetts, reprinted in THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE,
supra note 54, at 353.
61. See, e.g., id. at 379-438. This principle was originally declared in the Articles of
Confederation. U.S. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. II.
1352 [Vol. 47:1343
2006] "TUCKER'S RULE" 1353
imply that Congress is entitled to any powers not given by the
said Constitution; but such clauses are to be construed either as
exceptions to certain specified powers, or as inserted merely for
greater caution. 2
Other states, not content with a declaration of assumed princi-
ples, ratified the Constitution on the condition that specific
amendments be added as quickly as practicable.6 3 Several states
submitted lists of proposed amendments, all of which included a
clause expressly declaring the reserved powers and rights of the
states. Virginia's proposal, for example, declared, "[t]hat each
State in the Union shall respectively retain every power, jurisdic-
tion and right which is not by this Constitution delegated to the
Congress of the United States or to the departments of the
[Federal] Government."'
The Federalists who advocated the adoption of the Constitution
had no objection to adding such an amendment. After all, in the
state ratification conventions, they had argued that the structure of
the Constitution necessarily implied a principle of limited enumer-
ated federal power.65 Madison himself had written in Federalist No.
62. Amendments to the United States Constitution Proposed by State Ratifying
Conventions: New York (July 26, 1788), in THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note
54, at 356; see also 1 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS,
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 329 (Wash., D.C. 1836).
Under these impressions, and declaring that the rights aforesaid cannot be
abridged or violated, and that the explanations aforesaid are consistent with the
said Constitution, and in confidence that the amendments which shall have been
proposed to the said Constitution will receive an early and mature
consideration,-We, the said delegates, in the name and in the behalf of the
people of the state of New York, do, by these presents, assent to and ratify the
said Constitution.
Id.
63. See, e.g., Amendments Proposed to the Constitution by the Virginia Convention (June
27, 1788), in 3 ELLIOT, supra note 62, at 661.
64. Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention (June 27, 1788), reprinted in THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 675 (Neil H. Cogan
ed., 1997) [hereinafter THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS]. James Madison was a member of the
committee that drafted the Virginia proposal, and he later noted the role the Virginia proposal
played in his draft of the Bill of Rights. Letter from James Madison to George Washington
(Nov. 20, 1789), in 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1185 (Bernard Schwartz
ed., 1971) [hereinafter BILL OF RIGHTS].
65. See, e.g., Remarks of James Madison at the Virginia Convention (June 4 & 11, 1788),
3 ELLIOT, supra note 62, at 34-35, 258-59.
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45, "[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
federal government are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.""
Consequently, no opposition arose when Madison proposed an
amendment declaring that "It]he powers not delegated by this
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively."67 Madison's remarks after introducing the
provision to the House appear sedate-if not tepid:
I find, from looking into the amendments proposed by the State
conventions, that several are particularly anxious that it should
be declared in the Constitution, that the powers not therein
delegated should be reserved to the several States. Perhaps
words which may define this more precisely than the whole of
the instrument now does, may be considered as superfluous. I
admit they may be deemed unnecessary: but there can be no
harm in making such a declaration, if gentlemen will allow that
the fact is as stated. I am sure I understand it so, and do
therefore propose it."
Madison clearly considered the clause less than essential to the
Constitution. In fact, even the most vigorous proponents of states'
rights lacked enthusiasm for the proposed Tenth Amendment. They
did not object to Madison's draft, nor did they believe the principle
was unimportant. It was just, as Edmund Randolph put it, the
Tenth Amendment seemed unlikely to have any "real effect."6"
Everyone already assumed all nondelegated powers remained with
66. THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison), supra note 30, at 292.
67. Amendments to the Constitution Proposed by the House of Representatives (June 8,
1789), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 26 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner
eds., 1987).
68. Id. at 28.
69. Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (Dec. 6, 1789), in 5
DOCUMENTARY HISTORYOFTHE CONSTITUTION OFTHE UNITED STATES OFAMERICA, 1786-1870,
at 223 (Fred B. Rothman 1999) (1894) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. According to
Randolph,
[t]he twelfth [now Tenth] amendment does not appear to me to have any real
effect, unless it be to excite a dispute between the United States, and every
particular state, as to what is delegated. It accords pretty nearly with what our
convention proposed; but being once adopted, it may produce new matter for the
cavils of the designing.
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the states as evidenced by the presumed understanding of state
ratifying conventions like New York.70
The problem was not whether the proposed government consti-
tuted one of enumerated powers, but how to prevent the undue
expansion of those powers.71 Federal courts, as branches of the
federal government, would likely construe Congress's enumerated
powers in favor of federal authority.72 The Necessary and Proper
Clause, while it might suggest a limitation on federal power to
means actually "necessary" to accomplish an enumerated end,
could just as easily be read to expand the range of federal power.7"
Nor would the addition of express restrictions on federal power
necessarily solve the problem. Indeed, adding such restrictions could
compound the problem since enumerating certain rights might be
construed to allow federal power to extend to all matters except
those expressly prohibited.74 What the Constitution needed was a
70. Amendments to the United States Constitution Proposed by State Ratifying
Conventions: New York (July 26, 1788), in THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note
54, at 356. Adding the final phrase "or to the people" raised objections that the Tenth
Amendment actually undermined the principle that all nondelegated powers were reserved
to the states. Entry of Dec. 12, 1789, Journal of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Virginia
50, 64 (Richmond 1828).
71. For a discussion of Anti-Federalist concerns about judicial interpretation of the
proposed Constitution, see Powell, supra note 8, at 905-07 (1985).
72. For example, according to "Brutus":
The judicial power will operate to effect ... an entire subversion of the legislative,
executive and judicial powers of the individual states. Every adjudication of the
supreme court, on any question that may arise upon the nature and extent of the
general government, will affect the limits of the state jurisdiction. In proportion
as the former enlarge the exercise of their powers, will that of the latter be
restricted.... Not only will the constitution justify the courts in inclining to this
mode of explaining it, but they will be interested in using this latitude of
interpretation.
Brutus XI (Jan. 31, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 417, 420-21
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981); see also Lash, Original Meaning, supra note 39, at 351-55
(discussing "antifederalist fears regarding the potentially destructive power of the proposed
federal courts").
73. See Brutus V (Dec. 13, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra
note 72, at 389.
74. According to James Iredell in the North Carolina ratifying convention,
it would be not only useless, but dangerous, to enumerate a number of rights
which are not intended to be given up; because it would be implying, in the
strongest manner, that every right not included in the exception might be
impaired by the government without usurpation; and it would be impossible to
enumerate every one. Let any one make what collection or enumeration of rights
he pleases, I will immediately mention twenty or thirty more rights not
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
rule preventing unduly broad construction of enumerated federal
authority-a means of ensuring that the people of the individual
states would retain significant autonomy over those matters
thought best left to local control.
A number of state ratifying conventions provided proposals of just
such a rule of interpretation-proposals which Madison relied on
when he drafted his own version of the Ninth Amendment.75 The
Virginia ratifying convention, for example, proposed the following
amendment (which Madison himself helped draft):76
That those clauses which declare that Congress shall not
exercise certain powers be not interpreted in any manner
whatsoever to extend the powers of Congress. But that they may
be construed either as making exceptions to the specified powers
where this shall be the case, or otherwise as inserted merely for
greater caution."
Compare this with the original version of the Ninth Amendment
that Madison presented to the House of Representatives:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in
favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to dim-
inish the just importance of other rights retained by the people,
or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitution; but
either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely
for greater caution.78
contained in it.
Statement of James Iredell (July 29, 1788), in 4 ELLIOT, supra note 62, at 167; see also James
Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional Amendments, in WRITINGS 448-49
(Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999) (rejecting the notion that a Bill of Rights would endow the Federal
government with all powers not therein enumerated). In response, the Anti-Federalists
pointed out that the Constitution already contained a list of specific restrictions on federal
power in Article I, Section 9-thus making the proposed Constitution dangerous according to
the Federalists' own argument. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 28-30
(1999).
75. See, e.g., Russell L. Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA.
L. REV. 223 (1983), reprinted in THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE, supra note 54, at 276.
76. See supra note 64.
77. Amendments Proposed by the Virginia Convention (June 27, 1788), supra note 64, at
675.
78. Amendments to the Constitution Proposed by the House of Representatives (June 8,
1789), supra note 67, at 25.
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Madison's version of the Ninth Amendment echoed the Virginia
proposal79 and satisfied the calls by other state conventions for a
provision preventing the undue extension of federal power." It also
prevented any implied extension of federal power arising from the
addition of specific enumerated rights-including those in Article I,
Section 9.81
The House referred Madison's proposals to a Select Committee
(which, once again, included Madison)82 who deleted the language
expressly limiting the extension of federal power.8 3 This alteration
raised concerns in Virginia, where Edmund Randolph feared his
state's call for a provision limiting the construction of federal power
had gone unheeded.' Madison, however, believed the alteration in
language had not altered the substantive meaning of the clause, for
protecting the retained rights of the people in effect prohibited the
constructive enlargement of federal power. In a letter to George
Washington discussing Randolph's concerns about the Ninth
Amendment, Madison explained, "If a line can be drawn between
the powers granted and the rights retained, it would seem to be the
same thing, whether the latter be secured, by declaring that they
shall not be abridged, or that the former shall not be extended."85
According to Madison, the final draft of the Ninth Amendment
still expressed the original draft's principle of limited federal
power-only now expressed in the language of retained rights.88
79. Caplan, supra note 75, at 276.
80. See, e.g., Amendments to the United States Constitution Proposed by State
Ratification Conventions: New York, supra note 62, at 356.
81. See, e.g., Caplan, supra note 75, at 276-77.
82. Id. at 279-80.
83. The language added to the Constitution states: 'The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
84. See, e.g., Letter from Hardin Burnley to James Madison (Nov. 28, 1789), in 5
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 69, at 219.
85. Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Dec. 5, 1789), in 5 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 69, at 222.
86. Later constitutional commentators would agree with Madison that the Ninth both
preserved retained rights and prevented constructive expansion of federal power. For
example, in his COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, Joseph Story
wrote:
In regard to another suggestion, that the affirmance of certain rights might
disparage others, or might lead to argumentative implications in favor of other
powers, it might be sufficient to say, that such a course of reasoning could never
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In this way, the Ninth acted as a key companion to the Tenth
Amendment. Under the Tenth, Congress had only enumerated
powers. Under the Ninth, those enumerated powers could not be
construed in a manner denying or disparaging rights retained by
the people. 7
Madison publicly reaffirmed his power-constraining interpreta-
tion of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments while the Bill of Rights
remained pending in the critical state of Virginia.' In a speech
before the House of Representatives opposing the Bank of the
United States, Madison argued that only an unduly broad interpre-
tation of federal power would allow Congress to charter a national
bank. 9 Recounting the effort. to ratify the Constitution, Madison
reminded the House that Federalists had assured the state
ratifying conventions that the Constitution would not be construed
in such a latitudinarian manner. The state conventions, in turn,
had embraced this assurance through declarations and proposed
explanatory amendments. 9 If this well-known recent history were
not enough, Madison suggested the House simply refer to the
rules of interpretation declared by the pending Ninth and Tenth
Amendments (referred to as the "Eleventh" and "Twelfth"91):
be sustained upon any solid basis; and it could never furnish any just ground of
objection, that ingenuity might pervert, or usurpation overleap, the true sense.
That objection will equally lie against all powers, whether large or limited,
whether national or state, whether in a bill of rights, or in a frame of
government. But a conclusive answer is, that such an attempt may be
interdicted, (as it has been,) by a positive declaration in such a bill of rights, that
the enumeration of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people.
2 STORY, supra note 1, at 659 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. IX).
87. See Lash, Original Meaning, supra note 39, at 398-99.
88. Objections regarding the final version of the Ninth Amendment led Edmund Randolph
to halt Virginia's efforts to ratify the Bill of Rights. Anti-Federalists managed to exploit
Randolph's initial concerns (which he overcame) and delay ratification of the Bill of Rights for
two years. See 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 69, at 219-31 (1894) (containing the
correspondence among James Madison, Hardin Burnley, and George Washington discussing
the Virginia debate).
89. James Madison, Speech in Congress Opposing the National Bank (Feb. 2, 1791), in
WRITINGS, supra note 74, at 480-90.
90. Id. at 488-89.
91. This reflects an early convention whereby the first eight amendments were referred
to according to their place on an original list of twelve proposed amendments. What we know
as the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were the eleventh and twelfth on the list. See, e.g.,
Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (Dec. 6, 1789), in 5 DOCUMENTARY
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The explanatory amendments proposed by Congress themselves,
at least, would be good authority with [the state proposals]; all
these renunciations of power proceeded on a rule of construction,
excluding the latitude now contended for.... He read several of
the articles proposed, remarking particularly on the 11th. and
12th. the former, as guarding against a latitude of interpreta-
tion-the latter, as excluding every source of power not within
the constitution itself.'
A few months after Madison gave his Bank speech, Virginia voted
in favor of the last ten of twelve proposed amendments and the Bill
of Rights became part of our Constitution."' Although no evidence
suggests Madison's speech tipped the scale in favor of ratification,
the Virginia Assembly was entitled to rely on Madison's public
explanation of the Federalist nature of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments.9 4 Madison's speech remained well known for years.
Newspapers reprinted it decades later along with the accolade of
"the most luminous exposition" on the Bank question the writer had
HISTORY, supra note 69, at 222-23.
92. Madison, supra note 89, at 489.
93. See Letters to George Washington Announcing the Ratification of the Amendments
by the Virginia General Assembly, in 2 BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 64, at 1201-02.
94. Although Madison failed to stop the passage of the first Bank bill, his speech
continued to resonate with advocates of limited federal power. The Richmond Enquirer
reprinted the speech in its entirety when the charter was up for renewal in 1810. ENQUIRER
(Richmond), Jan. 4, 1810, at 4. When Vice President George Clinton cast the tiebreaking vote
in the Senate against renewing the Bank's charter, he explained that "[t]he power to create
corporations is not expressly granted; it is a high attribute of sovereignty and in its nature not
accessorial or derivative by implication, but primary and independent." 22 ANNALS OF CONG.
346 (1811) (statement of George Clinton, Vice President of the United States). Thus, if such
power was found to be necessary, the Constitution ought to be amended to allow it. This
argument, of course, is expressly laid out in Madison's 1791 speech on the topic. Madison,
supra note 89, at 480-90. Following the Supreme Court's decision upholding the Second Bank
of the United States in McCulloch v. Maryland, St. George Tucker added a note to his revised
edition of Blackstone's Commentaries acknowledging the decision, but directing his readers
to Madison's speech. See infra note 98; see also Spencer Roane, Letters to the Editor from
Hampden, ENQUIRER (Richmond), June 15 & 18, 1819, reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL'S
DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND, supra note 16, at 123, 133 (repeating Clinton's
argument that incidental powers must be subordinate to enumerated ends, and later referring
to Madison's "celebrated speech against the first bank law").
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ever seen. 5 St. George Tucker himself planned to add a reference to
it in the 1820s revised edition of his View on the Constitution.96
In his Bank speech, Madison presented the Ninth Amendment as
a rule of construction that preserves the principle enshrined in the
Tenth.9" In fact, without such a rule against "misconstruction," the
declaratory Tenth Amendment threatened to become an empty
promise-as other Founders recognized. Thomas Jefferson, in his
own opposition to the Bank charter, argued that the 'latitude of
construction" adopted by the Bank's proponents would destroy the
principle of enumerated powers declared in the Tenth Amendment:
I consider the foundation of the Constitution as laid on this
ground that "all powers not delegated to the U.S. by the
95. Letters to the Editor, ENQUIRER (Richmond), Jan. 4, 1810, at 4. The prefatory note
reads:
Sir,
I enclose you a paper containing Mr. Madison's speech on the original
establishment of the Bank of the United States.-Without debating much on the
general policy of the Banking system, as it affects the commerce and wealth of
our country, it goes at once into an investigation of the subject, on the broad and
important basis of its Constitutionality. As such, it is the most luminous
exposition which I have ever seen; & as the subject will probably be again
agitated, during the present session of Congress, it may not be improper, at this
time, to re-publish this speech. It will show the light in which this matter was
seen nineteen years ago, and in which it ought to be reviewed at this day, since
the Constitution is still silent, as it relates to the power of granting charters of
incorporation.
Id.
96. See St. George Tucker, Notes for Revised Version of 1 Tucker's Blackstone (n.d.), in
View of the Constitution, supra note 6, ed. app. at 287 (handwritten notes on facing pages of
Tucker's personal copy of Tucker's Blackstone, located at the Earl Gregg Swem Library at The
College of William and Mary). The following was to be added as note * to his discussion of the
Necessary and Proper Clause:
+ See also, the late President Madison's Speech in Congress in February 1791
against the Bill for establishing a Bank, published in the Richmond Enquirer,
vol: 6: no:73. January 4, 1810. But the question on the right of Congress to
establish a Bank, with branches in the several states is put at rest, by the
Decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, unanimously, in the case
of McCulloch vs the State of Maryland March 1819. 'That the Act to incorporate
the Bank of the U.S. is a law made in pursuance of the Constitution, and is a
part of the supreme law of the land." and also, "That the Law passed by the
Legislature of Maryland, imposing a Tax on the Bank of the U.S. is
unconstitutional and void."
Id.
97. Madison, supra note 89, at 489.
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Constitution, not prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to
the states or to the people...." If such a latitude of construction
be allowed to [the phrase "necessary and proper"] as to give any
non-enumerated power, it will go to every one, for these [sic] is
no one which ingenuity may not torture into a convenience, in
some way or other, to some one of so long a list of enumerated
powers. It would swallow up all the delegated powers, and
reduce the whole to one phrase as before observed .... The present
is the case of a right remaining exclusively with the states...."98
Echoing Jefferson's concerns, Attorney General Edmund Randolph
observed that, although governments without constitutions might
"claim a latitude of power not always easy to ... determine[j," the
federal government remained one of enumerated power as "con-
fessed by Congress, in the twelfth amendment."99 Canvassing the
various claimed sources of power for the Bank, Randolph concluded:
[A] similar construction on every specified federal power, will
stretch the arm of Congress into the whole circle of state
legislation.... [L]et it be propounded as an eternal question to
those who build new powers on this clause, whether the latitude
of construction which they arrogate will not terminate in an
unlimited power in Congress? °"
Both Jefferson and Randolph read the Tenth Amendment as
establishing a federal government of enumerated powers with all
nondelegated powers reserved to the states. Unduly latitudinarian
construction of enumerated federal power, however, promised to
undermine this arrangement by creating a government of essen-
tially unlimited (though enumerated) power. Accordingly, Randolph
and Jefferson advocated a rule of strict construction to preserve the
principle announced by the Tenth Amendment. The rule preserves
the principle.
98. THOMAS JEFFERSON, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a
National Bank (Feb. 15, 1791), reprinted in 19 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 275, 276-80
(Julian P. Boyd ed., 1974) (emphasis omitted).
99. Letter from Edmund Randolph to George Washington (Feb. 12, 1791), in H.
JEFFERSON POWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL 4 (1999) (discussing
the constitutionality of the Bank Bill).
100. Id. at 7.
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Madison, of course, read the Ninth Amendment as expressing just
such a rule, and other early constitutional commentators agreed. 01
In the very first Supreme Court opinion discussing the Ninth
Amendment, Justice Story followed the Madisonian reading of the
Ninth and used it to support a limited construction of federal power.
In the 1820 case Houston v. Moore, °2 Justice Story wrote that the
federal power to discipline the militia should not be read as
exclusive, so long as state rules on militia discipline did not conflict
with any federal statute.' Following the early convention of
referring to the Ninth as the "eleventh" amendment,"° Story
declared "[iun all other cases not falling within the classes already
mentioned, it seems unquestionable that the States retain concur-
rent authority with Congress, not only upon the letter and spirit of
the eleventh amendment of the constitution, but upon the soundest
principles of general reasoning."'1'°
In his 1803 View of the Constitution, St. George Tucker also
presented the Ninth Amendment as supporting a federalist rule of
strict construction.0 6 Constitutional commentator John Taylor did
likewise.0 7 In fact, bench and bar for the next one hundred and fifty
years cited the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as dual guardians of
federalism.
0 8
101. See, e.g., Lash, Original Meaning, supra note 39, at 398-99.
102. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
103. Id. at 51-52 (Story, J., dissenting).
104. The Ninth and Tenth Amendments were eleventh and twelfth on the list submitted
to the states for ratification. See supra note 91.
105. Houston, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 49.
106. See Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 6, ed. app. at 307-08.
107. In his Construction Construed and Constitutions Vindicated, political writer John
Taylor declared:
The [Ninth Amendment] prohibits a construction by which the rights retained
by the people shall be denied or disparaged; and the [Tenth] "reserves to the
states respectively or to the people the powers not delegated to the United States,
nor prohibited to the states." The precision of these expressions is happily
contrived to defeat a construction, by which the origin of the union, or the
sovereignty of the states, could be rendered at all doubtful.
JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED AND CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED 46 (Da Capo Press
1970) (1820).
108. The jurisprudence is presented in Lash, Lost Jurisprudence, supra note 39.
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B. The Rise of the Tenth Amendment"°9
Not long after their mutual adoption, the Tenth Amendment
overshadowed the Ninth as an expression of limited federal power.
Although it began as a federalist rule of construction, the Ninth
played second fiddle to the Tenth as a constitutional expression of
retained states' rights throughout the nineteenth century."'
Tucker's Commentaries cite both clauses in support of a rule of
strict construction, but Tucker himself often focused on the Tenth
as the primary expression of retained state autonomy."' Part of
understanding the history of Tucker's rule of strict construction
then, involves understanding how the Tenth-a clause originally
dismissed as having "little effect"-- became the primary expression
of limited federal power. Ironically, even though Madison believed
the Ninth Amendment served as a rule of strict construction, it
appears that his own 1800 Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts
established the Tenth Amendment as the central constitutional text
supporting a limited reading of federal power." 2
Enacted in the midst of growing tensions with France," 3 the
Sedition Act made the common law offense of seditious libel a
federal crime,114 and, in a move sure to inflame an already politically
charged atmosphere," 5 Federalist judges enforced the Act against
critics of the Adams administration." 6 Using the protected forums
of the state assemblies, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison
drafted and arranged for the presentation of the Kentucky and
Virginia Resolutions that declared that the Alien and Sedition
109. A more comprehensive discussion of the material in this Section can be found in Lash,
supra note 56.
110. See, e.g., infra notes 113-29 and accompanying text.
111. See infra Part IIA.
112. See infra notes 113-29 and accompanying text.
113. The Alien and Sedition Acts were composed of four statutes: the Alien Act, the Alien
Enemies Act, the Naturalization Act, and the Sedition Act. The texts of these Acts are located
in 9 ANNALS OF CONG. 3739-42, 3744-46, 3753-54, 3776-77 (1798). For a general discussion of
the '%YZ Affair" and the Federalist response, see ALBERT HALL BOWMAN, THE STRUGGLE FOR
NEUTRALITY: FRANcO-AMERICAN DIPLOMACY DURING THE FEDERALIST ERA 306-33 (1974).
114. William E. Nelson, The Province of the Judiciary, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 325, 329-30
(2004) (describing the Sedition Act).
115. Joanne B. Freeman, The Election of 1800: A Study in the Logic of Political Change, 108
YALE L.J. 1959, 1960 (1999).
116. See, e.g., United States v. Callender, 25 F. Cas. 239 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709).
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Acts were an unconstitutional exercise of federal power. 117 The
Resolutions proved controversial, prompting Madison to write his
Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts---essentially a defense of the
doctrines articulated in his Virginia Resolutions." 8 There, Madison
explained that Congress's attempt to exercise unenumerated
common law powers violated the constitutional principle that
powers not given to the government, were withheld from it; and
that if any doubt could have existed on this subject, under the
original text of the Constitution, it is removed as far as words
could remove it, by the 12th amendment ... which expressly
declares, "that the powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved
to the states respectively, or to the people."119
Ultimately, the Democratic-Republican Party of Jefferson and
Madison defeated the Federalists in the election of 1800, due in no
small part to popular reaction against the Sedition Act. 120 Madison's
Report of 1800,121 which Spencer Roane referred to as the Magna
Charta of the Republicans,'22 became a foundational document for
nineteenth-century advocates of states' rights. 2 The Report proved
so influential that its Tenth Amendment-based argument against
117. See Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions (Nov. 1798), reprinted in 5 FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, supra note 67, at 131-35; James Madison, Virginia Resolutions, reprinted in
5 FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 67, at 135-36.
118. JAMES MADISON, Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts, reprinted in WRITINGS, supra
note 74, at 608.
119. Id. at 610. According to John Marshall, Madison and the opponents of the Sedition Act
had mischaracterized the arguments in support of federal power. See Letter from John
Marshall to St. George Tucker (Nov. 27, 1800), in 6 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 23
(Charles F. Hobson ed., 1990).
120. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1500-03
(1987). According to Professor Amar, the popular response to the Acts, of which the Virginia
and Kentucky Resolutions were a major part, "effectively transformed the national election
of 1800 into a popular referendum on these bills." Id. at 1502.
121. See, e.g., Stunt v. The Steamboat Ohio, 3 Ohio Dec. Reprint 362 (1855), available at
1855 WL 3878, at *36-37.
122. Spencer Roane, Letter to the Editor from Hampden, ENQUIRER (Richmond), June 11,
1819, reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCULLOCH V. MARYLAND, supra note 16,
at 113.
123. See CORNELL, supra note 59, at 245 (explaining how the Report of 1800 "Would occupy
a central place in the canon of opposition thought," and describing Madison's report as the
"framework" upon which Anti-Federalist ideas could be directed at Federalists).
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the Acts effectively eclipsed the Ninth Amendment as the core
constitutional provision requiring the strict construction of federal
power.
It is difficult to overstate the influence of Madison's Report
of 1800 among states' rights theorists in the decades between
Jefferson's election and the Civil War. 124 St. George Tucker referred
to it numerous times in his 1803 constitutional treatise, A View of
the Constitution of the United States, repeating in particular
Madison's claim that Congress had exceeded the bounds established
by the Tenth Amendment.125 The state legislatures that resisted the
nationalist doctrine of McCulloch v. Maryland quoted it in their
remonstrances as the "true text-book of republican principles.' 2 s
When Jonathan Elliot compiled materials for his magisterial 1836
work, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption
of the Federal Constitution, he included 'Madison's Report on the
Virginia Resolutions," among his few post-adoption sources.2 7 As
Chief Justice Marshall wrote Justice Story in 1833, Madison's
Report along with the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions "consti-
tute the creed of every politician, who hopes to rise in Virginia; and
to question them ... is deemed political sacrilege."'28
As a canonical document to Republican advocates of states' rights,
Madison's Report established the Tenth Amendment as the key text
justifying a strict reading of federal power. Moreover, the Tenth
Amendment's explicit reference to the reserved powers of the states
made it more rhetorically acceptable than the Ninth to those who
viewed the Constitution as a compact between the federal govern-
ment and the individual states (and not as emanating from the
124. In a separate article, I develop more fully Madison's Report of 1800 and its effect on
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. See Lash, supra note 56.
125. See Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 6, ed. app. at 287; see also id. ed. app.
at 288, 302-03, 307 (describing the proper bounds of the Tenth Amendment and rejecting the
Madisonian view).
126. See, e.g., Report of the Joint Committee of the General Assembly of the Ohio
Legislature on the Bank of the United States, 37 ANNALS OF CONG. 1685, 1693 (1820).
127. 4 ELLIOT, supra note 62, at 546; see also THE VIRGINIA AND KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS
OF 1798 AND '99; WITH JEFFERSON'S ORIGINAL DRAUGHT THEREOF. ALSO, MADISON'S REPORT,
CALHOUN'S ADDRESS, RESOLUTIONS OF THE SEVERAL STATES IN RELATION TO STATE RIGHTS.
WITH OTHER DOCUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE JEFFERSONIAN DOCTRINES OF '98 (Jonathan
Elliot, ed., 1832).
128. Letter from Marshall to Story (July 31, 1833), in 4 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF
JOHN MARSHALL: THE BUILDING OF THE NATION, 1815-1835, at 577 (1919).
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undifferentiated American people).129 Madison's Report, however,
did not wholly displace the Ninth Amendment as the textual basis
for strict construction of federal power.130 Instead, it cemented the
Tenth in popular and professional understanding as a text suggest-
ing, if not demanding, the strict interpretation of enumerated
federal power. St. George Tucker wrote his View of the Constitution
in 1803, only three years after Madison wrote his Report. Not
surprisingly, Tucker rooted his rule of strict construction in both the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
II. TUCKER'S RULE AND MARSHALL'S NATIONALISM
A. Tucker's Rule of Construction
The first volume of Tucker's Blackstone presents the nature of
English law followed by an appendix with essays on the American
Constitution. 1 ' Beginning with the key concept of sovereignty,
Tucker's opening essay on American constitutional law distin-
guishes the parliamentary sovereignty of England with the popular
sovereignty of the American people.3 2 Later, in his discussion of
the history of Virginia, Tucker recalls how the colonial assemblies
129. For a discussion of compact theory and the role it played in early-nineteenth-century
constitutional debate, see WHITE, supra note 8, at 487-94.
130. See the many, many cases citing the Ninth Amendment as a federalist rule of
construction in Lash, Lost Jurisprudence, supra note 39.
131. 1 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 45.
132. According to Tucker:
[T]he American revolution has formed a new epoch in the history of civil
institutions, by reducing to practice, what, before, had been supposed to exist
only in the visionary speculations of theoretical writers.... The world, for the first
time since the annals of its inhabitants began, saw an original written compact
formed by the free and deliberate voices of individuals disposed to unite in the
same social bonds .... This memorable precedent ... led the way to that
instrument, by which the union of the confederated states has since been
completed, and in which, as we shall hereafter endeavor to sh[o]w, the
sovereignty of the people, and the responsibility of their servants are principles
fundamentally, and unequivocally, established; in which the powers of the
several branches of government are defined, and the excess of them, as well in
the legislature, as in the other branches, finds limits, which cannot be
transgressed without offending against that greater power from whom all
authority among us, is derived; to wit, the PEOPLE.
St. George Tucker, Of Sovereignty and Legislature, in 1 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES, supra note 45, ed. app. at 4 [hereinafter Tucker, Sovereignty and Legislature].
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defied the crown by continuing to meet after the order to disband,
and, by virtue of this very illegality, came to be viewed as conven-
tions of the people themselves.33 This American colonial experience,
as Gordon Wood explained, gave rise to a distinction between the
people and the ordinary operations of government."" According to
Tucker,
[a] distinction ... which certainly does exist between the indefi-
nite and unlimited power of the people, in whom the sovereignty
of these states, ultimately, substantially, and unquestionably
resides, and the definite powers of the congress and state
legislatures, which are severally limited to certain and determi-
nate objects, being no more than emanations from the former,
where, and where only, that legislative essence which constitutes
sovereignty can be found."3 5
Tucker premised his entire approach to the Constitution on these
opening declarations of popular sovereignty. Following the reason-
ing of Madison's Report of 1800, Tucker presented the Constitution
as a compact between the sovereign people(s) of the several states.'36
Since the ratification of the proposed Constitution exceeded the
power of the individual state governments due to state constitu-
tional restrictions,
a convention was therefore summoned, in every state by the
authority of their respective legislatures, to consider of the
propriety of adopting the proposed plan; and their assent made
it binding in each state; ... Here then are all the features of an
original compact, not only between the body politic of each state,
but also between the people of those states in their highest
sovereign capacity.'37
133. St. George Tucker, Of the Several Forms of Government, in 1 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES, supra note 45, ed. app. at 36-37 [hereinafter Tucker, Several Forms of
Government].
134. See WOOD, supra note 57, at 18-28.
135. Tucker, Sovereignty and Legislature, supra note 132, ed. app. at 5-6.
136. Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 6, ed. app. at 151.
137. Id. ed. app. at 150-51; see also Letter from Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Dec. 29,
1798), in WRITINGS, supra note 74, at 591 (distinguishing between the power of the state
legislature and the superior power of the people of the state).
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Tucker believed the Constitution represented a compact between
independent sovereigns-sovereigns whose independence survived
ratification.13 ' Echoing the understanding of the state ratification
conventions,'39 Tucker declared that "state governments ... retain
every power, jurisdiction, and right not delegated to the United
States.'40 Moreover, in interpreting those powers delegated to the
United States, the independent people(s) should not be presumed to
have surrendered any aspect of their independence absent express
written consent.
For, no free nation can be bound by any law but [its] own will;
and where that will is manifested by any written document, ...
only according as that will is expressed in the instrument by
which it binds itself. And as every nation is bound to preserve
itself, or, in other words, [its] independence; so no interpretation
whereby [its] destruction, or that of the state, which is the same
thing, may be hazarded, can be admitted in any case where it
has not, in the most express terms, given [its] consent to such an
interpretation. 141
Even after the state ratification debates, the critical issue still
remained how to interpret the powers expressly enumerated in the
138. St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 6, ed. app. at 141 ("It is a
compact; by which it is distinguished from a charter, or grant."). Tucker believed that the
Articles of Confederation themselves continued to operate to the extent they were not
modified by the Constitution. See Woodson v. Randolph (Va. Gen. Ct. 1799) (Tucker, J.)
(unpublished opinion on file at the Huntington Research Library, Randolph-Tucker Family
Papers, Part I, mssBR Box 6 (26 b)). The opinion explains:
The Articles of Confederation have never been rescinded by the United States;
they have been amended, by enlarging the powers of the federal Government,
and by changing its structure; but they have not been rescinded or annulled.
Everything therein contained, which is not altered by the subsequent Act of the
States, therefore remains in full force.
Id.
139. See Amendments to the United States Constitution Proposed by State Ratifying
Conventions: New York (July 26, 1788), supra note 62, at 356.
140. Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 6, ed. app. at 141-42.
141. St. George Tucker, Of the Unwritten, or Common Law, of England; And It's
Introduction into, and Authority Within the United American States, in 1 TUcKER,
BLAcKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 45, ed. app. at 36-37 [hereinafter Tucker, Authority
of English Common Law]; see also Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 6, ed. app. at
143 ("[Ilt is a ... maxim of political law, that sovereign states cannot be deprived of any of their
rights by implication; nor in any manner whatever but by their own voluntary consent....").
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Constitution. Here, Tucker relied on the Constitution itself as
having established the proper rules of interpretation. First, Tucker
conceded that certain aspects of the Constitution, such as the
federal government's power to act on individual citizens and not just
states as a collective body, could suggest that it consolidated the
separate peoples of the states into a unitary people of the United
States, thus "chang[ing] the nature of the union, from a confederacy,
to a consolidation of the states." '142 Under a "consolidation" view of
the Constitution, federal power would be broadly construed to allow
the attainment of ends previously attributed to state govern-
ments-namely, "procuring for the citizens whatever their necessi-
ties require, the conveniences and accommodations of life, and, in
general, whatever constitutes happiness."143
Tucker then pointed out that the Federalists denied just such a
reading of federal power in the ratification debates. "[FIriends and
supporters of the constitution" dismissed the idea that ratifying the
Constitution would consolidate the states.'44 To emphasize his
point, Tucker quoted extensively from the Federalist Papers and
Madison's explanation that "[t]he proposed constitution ... is in
strictness neither a national nor a federal constitution, but a
composition of both."45 According to Tucker, this Madisonian
balance between federal and state autonomy had particular
implications for the proper interpretation of federal power. This
requires an interpretation of federal power that preserves the
prerogatives of both state and federal governments, an interpretive
mandate declared by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.'4
Although federal power extends to the individual, all such power
should be interpreted with the individual's antecedent obligations
to the state in mind. Tucker feared that federal law would either
conflict with state law (in which case the individual would be
unjustifiably bound to obey federal law under the Supremacy
Clause), or force the individual to contend with dual obligations on
a matter meant to be left under local control.'47 To Tucker, the
142. Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 6, ed. app. at 144-45.
143. Id. ed. app. at 144.
144. Id. ed. app. at 146.
145. Id. ed. app. at 149.
146. See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
147. For example, matters involving municipal law, as Tucker explained in his next section.
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retained rights of the people included construing federal power to
maintain the proper spheres of federal and state authority. 48 The
rule of construction guarding this right found textual expression in
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments:
Accordingly we find the structure of the government, its several
powers and jurisdictions, and the concessions of the several
states, generally, pretty accurately defined, and limited. But to
guard against encroachments on the powers of the several
states, in their politic character, and of the people, both in their
individual and sovereign capacity, an amendatory article was
added, immediately after the government was organized,
declaring; that the powers not delegated to the United States, by
the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved
to the states, respectively, or to the people. [citing the Tenth
Amendment]. And, still further, to guard the people against
constructive usurpations and encroachments on their rights,
another article declares; that the enumeration of certain rights
in the constitution, shall not be construed to deny, or disparage,
others retained by the people. [citing the Ninth Amendment].
The sum of all which appears to be, that the powers delegated to
the federal government, are, in all cases, to receive the most
strict construction that the instrument will bear, where the
rights of a state or of the people, either collectively, or individu-
ally, may be drawn in question.149
Tucker's rule mirrors Madison's reading of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments."s The Tenth Amendment, by reserving to the states
all nondelegated powers, limits the federal government to those
powers expressly enumerated in the Constitution. The Ninth
Amendment, on the other hand, guards against "constructive
usurpations" or unduly broad interpretations of enumerated federal
power. Both amendments guard the rights of the people, whether
viewed as a matter of individual liberty or as the collective sover-
eign right of the people to retain certain matters under the control
of local government. 5' As Madison insisted in his speech on the
Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 6, ed. app. at 151.
148. Id. ed. app. at 154.
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. Lash, Original Meaning, supra note 39, at 398-99.
151. According to G. Edward White, Tucker believed that "the inalienable rights of man
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Bank controversy,"5 ' and again in his Report of 1800,153 preventing
the undue expansion of federal power was a matter of right since
limiting the construction of federal power by definition (necessarily)
preserves the retained rights of the people."5 As a state judge,
Tucker willingly enforced this right through the power of judicial
review and, on one remarkable occasion four years prior to Marbury
v. Madison, declared it the province and duty of state courts to
invalidate federal legislation in conflict with powers reserved to the
states under the Tenth Amendment. 5'
Tucker's rule of strict construction of federal power proved
influential. His treatise on the Constitution, the first of its kind,
became a cited authority in state and federal courts throughout the
country in the early decades of the nineteenth century.15 6 The rule
not only ran counter to broad articulations of federal power such as
Alexander Hamilton's defense of the first Bank of the United
preserved in the social compact were associated with the sovereign rights of the states
preserved in the federal compact: liberty and state autonomy were linked." WHITE, supra note
8, at 489.
152. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
154. Thus, the rule was negative in its operation: all constructions of the rights enumerated
in the Constitution that result in denial or disparagement of other rights are forbidden. U.S.
CONST. amend. IX.
155. See Woodson v. Randolph (Va. Gen. Ct. 1800) (Tucker, J.) (unpublished opinion on file
at the Huntington Research Library, Randolph-Tucker Family Papers, Part I, mssBR Box 6
(26b)). In Woodson, Tucker narrowly construed a federal tax on legal papers that prohibited
introducing into evidence in "any Court" any paper lacking a stamp indicating that the tax
had been paid. Id. at 472-76. According to Tucker, the law could not be applied to evidence
introduced in state court without violating the Tenth Amendment. Accordingly, he narrowly
construed the scope of the statute to not apply to state courts. Id. Tucker also declared that
he was willing to invalidate the federal law if his limited construction law was unreasonable.
Id. at 474. In order to justify the power of state courts to invalidate laws that conflict with the
Constitution, Tucker wrote an extended dissertation on the reserved powers of the states and
the coequal power of the courts to enforce the limits of the Constitution. Id. at 465-72.
Anticipating a number of arguments that John Marshall would use in Marbury v. Madison,
Tucker's opinion stands as the first extended discussion and justification of the power of
judicial review by any judge, state or federal, prior to Marbury.
Tucker's opinion was not reported (since there were no state reporters at the time) and it
has been completely unknown prior to this symposium. In preparing our articles for this
conference, Professor Charles Hobson and I both independently discovered the unreported
opinion; he in the Earl Gregg Swem Library at The College of William and Mary, and I in the
Randolph-Tucker collection at the Huntington Research Library. For Hobson's discussion of
this interesting case, see Hobson, supra note 49, at 1275-76.
156. See, e.g., Garland v. Harrison, 35 Va. (3 Leigh) 368, 387 (1837); Lambert's Lessee v.
Paine, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 97, 125 (1805).
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States, 5 7 it also ran head-on into the views of a Supreme Court
Chief Justice who sought to enshrine Hamilton's nationalist views
as the law of the land.
B. The Nationalism of John Marshall
1. McCulloch v. Maryland
Despite Hamilton's successful advocacy on behalf of the first Bank
of the United States, the institution remained controversial and
Congress allowed the Bank's charter to lapse in 1811.158 When
Congress voted to establish the second Bank in 1815, now President
Madison vetoed the bill but demurred on the subject of the Bank's
constitutionality. 159 When the Bank bill came up again in 1816,
however, he reluctantly agreed to sign it.160 In protest, the Maryland
157. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bank (Feb. 23, 1791),
reprinted in 3 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 67, at 247-48.
158. David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARv. L. REV.
1457, 1474 (2001).
159. See id.
160. See id. Despite doing so, Madison never relinquished his doubts about the method of
interpretation required to justify federal power to charter the Bank. See Letter from James
Madison to Mr. Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), reprinted in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON, 1829-1836, at 183 (Phila., J.B. Lippincott 1865). Madison acquiesced on the
basis of the Bank's usefulness and deference to past precedent. Id. at 186 ("A veto from the
Executive, under these circumstances, with an admission of the expediency and almost
necessity of the measure, would have been a defiance of all the obligations derived from a
course of precedents amounting to the requisite evidence of the national judgment and
intention."). In fact, as Madison's notes on McCulloch in his Detached Memoranda indicate,
his views never changed regarding the erroneous methods of constitutional interpretation
required to justify the Bank:
Force of precedents in case of the Bank--& in expounding the Constn. equal
division of Senate, when the Bill negatived by V.P. not occasioned by
unconstitutionality but inexpediency of the Bill. reasoning of Supreme
Ct-founded on erroneous views &-. as to the ratification of Const: by people
if meant people collectively & not by States. 2. imputing concurrence of those
formerly opposed to change of opinion, instead of precedents superseding
opinion. 3. endeavoring to retain right of Court to pronounce on the consty of law
after making Legisl omnipotent as to the expediency of means. 4. expounding
power of Congs-as if no other Sovereignty existed in the States supplemental
to the enumerated powers of Congs-5. making the Judy-exclusive expositor of
the Constitutionality of laws: the co-ordinate authorities Legisl-&
Execut-being equally expositors within the scope of their functions.
JAMES MADISON, Detached Memoranda, reprinted in WRITINGS, supra note 74, at 756.
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Assembly in 1818 enacted an annual tax of $15,000 on any bank not
chartered by the state."6 ' When cashier James William McCulloch
refused to pay the tax, he was sued in state court and fined.6 2
Ultimately, the case landed before the Supreme Court where Chief
Justice Marshall ruled in favor of the federal government in
McCulloch v. Maryland.'63
Although in 1791 Madison argued that both the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments prevented the charter,'6 the Bank's opponents in
McCulloch followed the traditional post-1800 states' rights theory
and focused on the Tenth Amendment as precluding federal
intrusion into matters properly regulated by the states. 165 In his
opinion, Marshall said nothing about the Ninth Amendment and
mentioned the Tenth simply to support the idea that Congress has
both express and implied powers." Rather than restricting the
powers of Congress, Marshall blandly explained that the Tenth
Amendment "was framed for the purpose of quieting the excessive
jealousies which had been excited."' 67
Marshall correctly concluded that the Tenth Amendment does not
forbid Congress from exercising implied power,' and neither
Maryland's attorney nor any other strict constructionist at the time
asserted otherwise. 169 The critical issue, however, involved whether
161. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 317-21 (1819).
162. Id. at 317-19.
163. Id. at 316.
164. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 372-74.
166. Id. at 406. This same argument regarding the Tenth Amendment was made in defense
of the Alien and Sedition Acts. See Report of the Minority on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 22,
1799), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 67, at 136, 137. The editors
of the FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION attribute the Minority Report to John Marshall. Id. at 136.
167. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406.
168. As Justice Story put it in section 1901 of his Commentaries:
It is plain, therefore, that it could not have been the intention of the framers of
[the Tenth Amendment] to give it effect, as an abridgment of any of the powers
granted under the constitution, whether they are express or implied, direct or
incidental. Its sole design is to exclude any interpretation, by which other
powers should be assumed beyond those, which are granted. All that are granted
in the original instrument, whether express or implied, whether direct or
incidental, are left in their original state. All powers not delegated, (not all
powers not expressly delegated,) and not prohibited, are reserved.
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, supra note 67, at 406, 406-07.
169. For years, opponents had objected to the Bank not because Congress lacked implied
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the Constitution placed any limits on the range of implied means to
advance enumerated ends. To theorists like Tucker, the proper
construction of federal power began by recognizing that the
Constitution represented a compact between the sovereign people
of the several states. 7 ° Thus, federal power (while concededly
supreme) ought to be construed bearing in mind the residual
sovereignty of these several "peoples." 171 Marshall, however,
declined to confront the issue of independent sovereign people(s),
and instead presented the issue as a choice between state sover-
eignty and popular sovereignty:
In discussing this question, the counsel for the State of
Maryland have deemed it of some importance, in the construc-
tion of the constitution, to consider that instrument not as
emanating from the people, but as an act of sovereign and
independent States. The powers of the general government, it
has been said, are delegated by the States, who alone are truly
sovereign; and must be exercised in subordination to the States,
who alone possess supreme dominion. 7 '
powers, but because those powers could not be stretched to include such an important power
as a bank charter. For instance, in his original speech on the Bank of the United States,
Madison argued that implied powers existed, but that they must be subordinate to express
powers. See Madison, supra note 89, at 480, 489. No great and important power should be
included among Congress's implied powers, but instead required a separate and express
enumeration. Id. at 490. Stretching implied powers to include great and important powers like
chartering a bank would violate promises made to the state conventions like those in Virginia
and New York and would thwart the express restrictions of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments. Id. at 489. This same argument about "subordinate" incidental powers
convinced Vice President George Clinton to cast his tiebreaking vote against renewing the
Bank's original charter. See 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 346 (1811). Judge Spencer Roane repeated
the same argument in his essays criticizing Marshall's opinion in McCulloch. See Spencer
Roane, Letter to the Editor from Hampden, ENQUIRER (Richmond), June 15, 1819, reprinted
in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND, supra note 16, at 123 (arguing
that incidental powers must be subordinate to the enumerated end). In his argument before
the Court in McCulloch, Maryland's attorney general, Luther Martin, essentially
recapitulated Madison's original argument, including Madison's reminder about the
understanding of the state conventions and the prohibition on construing a great and
important power as an implied power. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 373-74.
170. See, e.g., Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 6, ed. app. at 150-51.
171. In his Detached Memoranda, Madison criticized Marshall for "expounding [the] power
of Cong[ress]-as if no other Sovereignty existed in the States supplemental to the
enumerated powers of Cong[ress]." MADISON, supra note 160, at 756.
172. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 402.
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The Chief Justice disposed of this straw man with ease: "The
government of the Union ... is, emphatically, and truly, a govern-
ment of the people. In form and substance it emanates from them.
Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on
them, and for their benefit."7 ' As Madison later pointed out,
Marshall's declaration is conspicuously ambiguous-did "the people"
retain a separate state-specific identity, or had the adoption of the
Constitution consolidated them into a unitary mass? 74 Despite his
denial of consolidation,'75 Marshall proceeded under the assumption
that America consisted of but one national people who happened to
live in different states.7 6 As a result, the Constitution should be
construed to advance the national purposes of that unitary people.
As Marshall put it, "[t]he government proceeds directly from the
people.... It is the government of all; its powers are delegated by all;
it represents all, and acts for all."'77 Of all the contentions in
McCulloch, Marshall's assertion that federal power came by way of
a grant from a unitary people, and not from the people of the several
states, evoked the quickest, and loudest, objection. 7 '
When Marshall finally turned to the proper rule for construing
the scope of federal power, he argued for a broad construction of the
Constitution that authorized any nonprohibited means related to an
enumerated end. According to Marshall:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitu-
tional.7 9
173. Id. at 404-05.
174. See MADISON, supra note 160, at 756.
175. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 403 ("No political dreamer was ever wild enough to
think of breaking down the lines which separate the States, and of compounding the American
people into one common mass.").
176. Id. ("Of consequence, when they act, they act in their States. But the measures they
adopt do not, on that account, cease to be the measures of the people themselves, or become
the measures of the State governments.").
177. Id. at 403, 405.
178. See Amphictyon, Letter to the Editor, ENQUIRER (Richmond), Mar. 30, 1819, reprinted
in MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULOCH V. MARYLAND, supra note 16, at 55-57; see also
MADISON, supra note 160, at 756 (rejecting Marshall's unitary people theory as erroneous).
179. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
2006] 1375
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Determining which available means was necessary and proper was
a matter for the political branches, not the courts. 8 ' Anticipating
objections that such a broad reading of federal power might seem to
grant Congress unlimited discretion to determine the scope of its
own power, Marshall added a caveat:
Should Congress, in the exercise of its powers, adopt measures
which are prohibited by the constitution; or should Congress,
under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the
accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it
would become the painful duty of this tribunal ... to say that
such an act was not the law of the land. 181
Remarkably, Marshall urged that his broad reading of federal power
was implied by the enumerated restrictions on federal power placed
in the Constitution. 'Why else," Marshall rhetorically asked, "were
some of the limitations found in the ninth section of the [first
article] introduced?" '182 Despite the fact that the Ninth Amendment
was added to prevent reading the enumerated restrictions as
suggesting otherwise unlimited federal power, Marshall appears to
have done exactly that. The construction feared by Anti-Federalists
and supposedly prevented by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments had
seemingly come to pass.
2. Response to Marshall's "Latitudinarian" Interpretation of
Federal Power
Criticism of Marshall's opinion was swift and voluminous.
Ardent Republican John Taylor, who delivered Madison's Virginia
Resolutions,"8 3 ridiculed Marshall's opinion in his colorfully titled
book, Construction Construed and Constitutions Vindicated: s "As
180. See id. at 423 ("Mo undertake here to inquire into the degree of its necessity, would
be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative
ground.").
181. Id. at 423.
182. Id. at 407.
183. See F. Thornton Miller, Foreword to JOHN TAYLOR, TYRANNY UNMASKED, at xiii (F.
Thornton Miller ed., Liberty Fund 1992) (1822).
184. TAYLOR, supra note 107.
[Vol. 47:13431376
"TUCKER'S RULE"
ends may be made to beget means, so means may be made to beget
ends, until the co-habitation shall rear a progeny of unconstitutional
bastards, which were not begotten by the people ..... "' To Taylor,
Marshall had violated the proper rule of construction presented by
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments:
The [ninth] amendment prohibits a construction by which the
rights retained by the people shall be denied or disparaged; and
the [tenth] "reserves to the states respectively or to the people the
powers not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to the
states." The precision of these expressions is happily contrived
to defeat a construction, by which the origin of the union, or the
sovereignty of the states, could be rendered at all doubtful."s
Other critics echoed Taylor's criticism of McCulloch. The editor of
the Richmond Enquirer, Thomas Richie, published a series of
pseudonymous papers written by "Amphictyon" and "Hampden,"
both of whom castigated Marshall's broad interpretation of federal
power."8 7 In his essays, Amphictyon accused the Chief Justice of
185. Id. at 84.
186. Id. at 46. Taylor goes on:
In one other view, highly gratifying, these two amendments correspond with the
construction I contend for. Several previous amendments had stipulated for
personal or individual rights, as the government of the union was invested with
a limited power of acting upon persons; these stipulate for political conventional
rights. But different modes are pursued. By the first, certain specified
aggressions are forbidden; by the second, all the rights and powers not delegated
are reserved. The first mode is imperfect, as the specified aggressions may be
avoided, and yet oppression might be practised in other forms. By the second,
specification is transferred to the government of the union; and the states,
instead of being the grantees of limited rights, which might have been an
acknowledgement of subordination, are the grantors of limited powers; and
retain a supremacy which might otherwise have been tacitly conceded.... Thus
the powers reserved are only exposed to specified deductions, whilst those
delegated are limited, with an injunction that the enumeration of certain rights
shall not be construed to disparage those retained though not specified, by not
having been parted with. The states, instead of receiving, bestowed powers; and
in confirmation of their authority, reserved every right they had not conceded,
whether it is particularly enumerated, or tacitly retained. Among the former, are
certain modes by which they can amend the constitution; among the latter, is
the original right by which they created it.
Id. at 48-49.
187. The essays are reproduced in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V.
MARYLAND, supra note 16, at 52-77, 106-54.
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having adopted a 'liberal and latitudinous construction" of the
Necessary and Proper Clause:' "[S]o wide is the latitude given to
the words 'general welfare,' in one of these clauses, and to the word
'necessary' in the other, that it will, (if the construction be persisted
in) really become a government of almost unlimited powers."" 9 This,
argued Amphictyon, conflicted with the proper vision of federal
power because "[tlhe government of the U.S. is one of specified and
limited powers.... The state governments have all residuary power;
every thing necessary for the protection of the lives, liberty and
property of individuals is left subject to their control....' This
"residuary power was left in possession of the states for wise
purposes. It is necessary that the laws which regulate the daily
transactions of men should have a regard to their interests, their
feelings, even their prejudices." 9' If the rule of McCulloch prevailed,
the judiciary would lack the ability to control federal expansion into
the powers reserved to the states. Scoffing at Marshall's claim that
the Court had the "painful duty" to invalidate mere pretextual
assertions of enumerated power,'92 Amphictyon wrote, "[t]he
latitude of their construction will render it unnecessary for them to
discharge a duty so 'painful' to their feelings.' 93
3. Gibbons v. Ogden
Five years later, litigants continued to press the strict construc-
tion views of St. George Tucker and the federalist reading of the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments when the Marshall Court considered
what would be its second major congressional powers decision,
Gibbons v. Ogden."9 Gibbons involved a dispute over New York's
188. See AVirginian's"Amphictyon" Essays (Mar. 30,1819), reprinted in JOHNMARSHALL'S
DEFENSE OF MCCULLLOCH V. MARYLAND, supra note 16, at 53. Editor Gerald Gunther
suggests that the "Amphictyon" essays were "probably written by Judge William
Brockenbough." JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCULLOCH V. MARYLAND, supra note 16, at
1. The "Hampden" essays were written by Spencer Roane. Id. at 106.
189. A Virginian's "Amphictyon" Essays (Mar. 30, 1819), supra note 188, at 65.
190. Id. at 70.
191. Id. at 71.
192. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819).
193. A Virginian's "Amphictyon" Essays (Mar. 30, 1819), supra note 188, at 75. The
criticism was serious enough to prompt John Marshall to write his own anonymous defense
of McCulloch. See JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND at 155.
194. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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grant of a steam navigation monopoly to Robert Fulton and Robert
Livingston.195 While the New York courts had previously upheld the
monopoly in cases such as Livingston v. Van Ingen, the monopoly
now faced a challenge on the ground that it interfered with Con-
gress's exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce. 19 7 Thomas
A. Emmet 9' represented Fulton and Livingston and their assignee,
Aaron Ogden. In his lengthy argument before the Court, Emmet
claimed that states retained concurrent power to regulate com-
merce except in cases involving a direct conflict between state
and federal regulation,'" and cited Tucker's Ninth and Tenth
Amendment-based rule of strict construction, °" as well as Justice
Story's opinion in Houston v. Moore.2"1 On this point, Emmet quoted
Justice Story's reference to the "11th Amendment" in Houston."2
In striking down the state monopoly, Chief Justice Marshall
declined to address either the Ninth or the Tenth Amendment. He
also rejected the argument that Congress lacked power to grant
Gibbons a coasting license, and went on to rule that the state
monopoly was in direct conflict with the federal license and
195. Id. at 1-2.
196. 9 Johns. 507, 560-61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1812).
197. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 17.
198. Emmet's name is misspelled in the U.S. Reports. See id. at 79.
199. Id. at 130-31. Emmet made a similar argument in North River Steamboat Co. v.
Livingston:
What, then is this trade which Congress can regulate? It is that carried on from
within the geographical limits of one State to within those of another. It has no
relation to the trade or contracts between individuals. How can Congress
regulate the trade and intercourse between man and man, even though they
should reside in different States or countries? Its regulations can only act on
commerce as a mass, carried on between two States or nations. This trade, thus
defined, together with foreign trade, is all that it belongs to Congress to
regulate; the rest remains to the States, under the denomination of internal
trade, and which it is not therefore necessary to define. It includes all that is not
taken by the Constitution out of the general mass of commerce. It belongs to the
States individually: not because the Constitution has given it to them,-for that
instrument gives nothing whatsoever to the States,-but because it appertains
to sovereign power, and has not been delegated to Congress; and the grants of
power which are made to Congress, so far as they may interfere with the rights
of States, are to receive the strictest construction.
1 Hopk. Ch. 149, 190-91 (N.Y. Ch. 1824) (citing Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note
6, ed. app. at 154).
200. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 86.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 130-31.
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therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause." 3 As far as Emmet's
call for strict construction, Marshall dismissed Tucker's rule as if it
had no basis at all:
This instrument contains an enumeration of powers expressly
granted by the people to their government. It has been said, that
these powers ought to be construed strictly. But why ought they
to be so construed? Is there one sentence in the constitution
which gives countenance to this rule? In the last of the enumer-
ated powers, that which grants, expressly, the means for
carrying all others into execution, Congress is authorized "to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper" for the
purpose. But this limitation on the means which may be used, is
not extended to the powers which are conferred; nor is there one
sentence in the constitution, which has been pointed out by the
gentlemen of the bar, or which we have been able to discern,
that prescribes this rule.2"
203. Id. at 239-40. Justice Story was on the Court at the time of Gibbons, but wrote no
opinion. See Jim Chen, Judicial Epochs in Supreme Court History: Sifting Through the Fossil
Record for Stitches in Time and Switches in Nine, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 677, 705 (2003). Even
if Story still held the views he announced in Houston, he would have agreed with the result
in Gibbons; Story believed that the federal commerce power was exclusive. See David P.
Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: Contracts and Commerce, 1836-1864, 1983
DUKE L.J. 471, 476.
204. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 187-88. Although by this time Marshall had abandoned
his anonymous pamphleteering, he could not resist taking a final shot at his detractors:
Powerful and ingenious minds, taking, as postulates, that the powers expressly
granted to the government of the Union, are to be contracted by construction,
into the narrowest possible compass, and that the original powers of the States
are retained, if any possible construction will retain them, may, by a course of
well digested, but refined and metaphysical reasoning, founded on these
premises, explain away the constitution of our country, and leave it, a
magnificent structure, indeed, to look at, but totally unfit for use. They may so
entangle and perplex the understanding, as to obscure principles, which were
before thought quite plain, and induce doubts where, if the mind were to pursue
its own course, none would be perceived. In such a case, it is peculiarly
necessary to recur to safe and fundamental principles to sustain those
principles, and, when sustained, to make them the tests of the arguments to be
examined.
Id. at 222. Given the use of Tucker's works by Ogden's counsel, this passage might seem
directed at Tucker himself. See id. at 86. Tucker and Marshall, however, were lifelong friends.
John V. Orth, John Marshall and the Rule of Law, 49 S.C. L. REv. 633, 635-36 n.10 (1998)
(book review). Thus, the passage is more likely targeted toward essayists like Spencer Roane
and John Taylor of Caroline whose attacks on McCulloch probably still rankled the Chief
Justice. See supra notes 183-93 and accompanying text.
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In his earlier opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, Marshall simply
ignored the Ninth Amendment despite its key role in Madison's
original speech against the Bank of the United States and despite
the continued influence of the speech at the time." 5 In Gibbons,
Marshall again ignored the Ninth, despite Emmet's express reli-
ance on it and his quotation of Justice Story's Ninth Amendment-
based reasoning in Houston."' Instead, Marshall announced that
Congress's power to regulate commerce is "complete in itself, may
be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations,
other than are prescribed in the constitution. 2 7
What McCulloch implied, Gibbons made express: the powers of
the federal government had no constructive limits beyond those
expressly "prescribed in the constitution. '20 ' The conflict between
Marshall's rule of construction and the language and purpose of
the Ninth Amendment is striking. The Ninth expressly prohibits
construing enumerated restrictions on federal power as exhaus-
tive,20 9 but Marshall read them in precisely that way. In fact,
Marshall never once referred to the Ninth Amendment or relied on
the Tenth during his entire tenure on the Supreme Court. The
nationalism of the Chief Justice left no room for federalist limita-
tions on congressional power. Marshall's nationalism, however,
lasted no longer than the Marshall Court itself.
205. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text; see also Lash, Original Meaning, supra
note 39, at 415-16 & n.405.
206. Houston was an opinion Marshall most likely joined. See supra note 201 and
accompanying text.
207. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196.
208. Id. at 196-97.
209. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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III. THE ROLLBACK OF MARSHALL'S NATIONALISM AND THE
RESTORATION OF TUCKER'S RULE
A. Defending Marshall: Story's Commentaries on the
Constitution21 °
Joseph Story published his Commentaries on the Constitution in
the midst of the Nullification Crisis.21' As his opening tribute to
John Marshall suggests,2 2 Story devoted his work to reestablishing
the constitutional basis of the Marshall Court's nationalist reading
of federal authority. In addition to refuting states' rights theories
such as those advanced by Madison and Jefferson in their Virginia
and Kentucky Resolutions,1 3 Story spent considerable time
attacking Tucker's rule of strict construction. 21 '4 Tucker had based
his arguments on the writings of Emerich de Vattel and the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments. 5 Story strongly criticized Tucker's
reliance on Vattel and the Tenth Amendment 216 but said nothing
about Tucker's reliance on the Ninth. Instead, Story treated
Tucker's rule of strict construction in the same way Marshall had,
as if it were based on nothing at all.217
As the proper alternative to Tucker's rule, Story presented Chief
Justice Marshall's formulation of federal power. After quoting
Marshall's statement in Gibbons that not a single sentence in the
210. Some portions of the following subpart also appear in Lash, Lost Jurisprudence, supra
note 39, at 632-33.
211. For a fine discussion of the Nullification Crisis and the publication of Story's
Commentaries, see 4 BEVERIDGE, supra note 128, at 518-80.
212. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., 1 STORY, supra note 1, at 287 n.1, 289 n.1.
214. The criticism is implicit throughout the first volume, but see especially, id. at 393-407.
215. See Tucker, View of the Constitution, supra note 6, ed. app. at 151.
216. See 1 STORY, supra note 1, at 393.
217. See id. at 396.
When it is said, that the constitution of the United States should be construed
strictly, viewed as a social compact, whenever it touches the rights of property,
or of personal security, or liberty, the rule is equally applicable to the state
constitutions in the like cases. The principle, upon which this interpretation
rests, if it has any foundation, must be, that the people ought not to be presumed
to yield up their rights of property or liberty, beyond what is the clear sense of
the language and the objects of the constitution.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Constitution suggests a limited reading of federal power,218 Story's
Commentaries adopts Marshall's reasoning in McCulloch, constru-
ing the enumerated restrictions of Article I, Section 9 as suggesting
an otherwise broad degree of federal power--once again ignoring the
obvious conflict with the Ninth Amendment. 19 Story even devoted
an entire chapter to constitutional "Rules of Interpretation" that
fails to acknowledge the existence of a clause in the Bill of Rights
expressly declaring a rule of interpretation.2 0
Justice Story had good reason for his emphatic defense of the
Marshall Court's broad reading of federal power. When Story
published his Commentaries, Marshallian nationalism had lost
significant legal ground.22 ' In Gibbons, Marshall intimated that
federal power to regulate interstate commerce was exclusive.22 By
1829, however, in Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.,223 the
Marshall Court upheld state power to construct a dam across a
navigable stream, an obstruction clearly falling within federal
authority under the reasoning of Gibbons.24 If Willson revealed a
crack in the dam (as it were) of Marshall's expansive view of federal
218. Id. at 401-02.
219. Id. at 413-15. For a discussion of how Marshall's approach in McCulloch conflicts with
the Ninth Amendment, see Lash, Original Meaning, supra note 39, at 417-22.
220. When addressing the concurrent powers of state governments, Story quotes his earlier
language from Houston-but with the reference to the Ninth Amendment edited out. See
Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 51-52 (1820) (Story, J., dissenting).
221. Indeed, some have argued that the nationalist decisions themselves triggered a
backlash of states' rights activism. See Michael J. Klarman, How Great Were the "Great"
Marshall Court Decisions?, 87 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1144 (2001).
[It is clear that nationalist decisions such as McCulloch and Gibbons had little
concrete effect, given that Congress did not take up the Court's broad invitation
to exercise national power until well after the Civil War, at which point the
invitation was partially withdrawn. While measuring the intangible
consequences of Supreme Court decisions is more difficult, it is entirely possible
that rulings like McCulloch were more important for mobilizing states' rights
opposition to the Marshall Court than for educating public opinion in support of
the Court's nationalism.
Id.
222. See supra notes 190-209 and accompanying text.
223. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
224. See JESSUP, supra note 17, at 324. Other scholars have also noted the seeming retreat
of the Marshall Court in its later years. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES:
POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REvIEW 175 (2004).
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power, then the dam broke in 1837 when the new Taney Court
decided a trio of cases, 225 particularly Mayor of New York v. Miln.226
In Gibbons v. Ogden, Marshall concluded that the meaning of
"commerce" included the carriage of passengers and further
suggested that federal commercial power not only reached a local
level, but might well be exclusive (apart from a few exceptions). 227
By the time of Miln, decided shortly after Chief Justice Marshall
died, a new majority of the Supreme Court upheld a state's power
to demand that the master of a vessel provide data concerning
transatlantic passengers. In his opinion, Justice Barbour embraced
the theory of independent state power, and he restored Tucker's
view that municipal law fell wholly outside the reach of federal
authority:
[A] state has the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction
over all persons and things, within its territorial limits, as any
foreign nation; where that jurisdiction is not surrendered or
restrained by the constitution of the United States.... That all
those powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, or
what may, perhaps, more properly be called internal police, are
not thus surrendered or restrained; and that, consequently, in
relation to these, the authority of a state is complete, unquali-
fied, and exclusive.228
225. See Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837); Briscoe v. Bank of Ky.,
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837); Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420
(1837). David Currie writes:
The new day dawned with a bang in 1837, when the three big cases so long
postponed were finally decided: New York v. Miln, Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky,
and Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge. Each concerned limitations on state
power; in each the Court upheld state authority; in each Story wrote an
impassioned dissent lamenting the dismantling of all that Marshall had built.
Currie, supra note 203, at 473.
226. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837). According to Dwight Jessup, "[a]lthough the political
response [to cases like Gibbons and Cohens] failed to restrict or modify the official power and
structure of the federal judiciary, it succeeded in frightening an activist, nationalist Court into
restraining its judgments and consciously moving to consolidate its position." JESSUP, supra
note 17, at 431.
227. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209 (1824) ("There is great force in this
argument [that federal power to regulate interstate commerce is exclusive], and the Court is
not satisfied that it has been refuted."). For more on Gibbons, see supra Part H.B.3 and
accompanying text.
228. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 139.
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Justice Barbour's description of state authority in Miln is the exact
opposite of Marshall's assertion in Gibbons that Congress's power
to regulate commerce was "complete in itself, may be exercised to its
utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are
prescribed in the constitution."229 Justice Story clearly perceived the
contradiction, but could only weakly invoke the name of the late
Chief Justice in his dissent:
I have the consolation to know that I had the entire concurrence,
upon the same grounds, of that great constitutional jurist, the
late Mr. Chief Justice Marshall. Having heard the former
arguments, his deliberate opinion was, that the act of New York
was unconstitutional; and that the present case fell directly
within the principles established in the case of Gibbons v.
Ogden.... 23
Miln was one of a series of opinions decided in early 1837,231 all of
which took a decidedly more protective view of state autonomy than
the prior opinions of Marshall.232 In Charles River Bridge v. Warren
Bridge,233 the Court rejected a broad reading of the Impairment of
Contracts Clause and upheld the state's right to build a new bridge
across the Charles River. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Taney
declared, 'We cannot deal thus with the rights reserved to the
states; and by legal intendments and mere technical reasoning, take
away from them any portion of that power over their own internal
police and improvement, which is so necessary to their well being
and prosperity."2 4 The Supreme Court decided both Miln and
Charles River Bridge on the assumption that the Constitution left
certain local matters completely off-limits to the federal govern-
229. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196.
230. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 161 (Story, J., dissenting). In his concurrence, Justice Smith
Thompson reminded Justice Story of his earlier opinion in Houston v. Moore and quoted
Story's earlier Ninth Amendment-based rule of construction as representing the proper
approach to determining the scope of federal power. Id. at 150-51 (Thompson, J., concurring).
231. For a discussion of the Taney Court's landmark decisions in 1837, see DAVID P.
CURRIE, THE CONSTrTUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT, THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS: 1789-1888,
at 204 (1985), which discusses The Three Bombshells of 1837."
232. See Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 102; Briscde v. Bank of Ky., 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837);
Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
233. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 420.
234. Id. at 552.
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ment-and both enumerated powers and restrictions should be
construed accordingly. In his 1837 treatise, A General View of the
Origin and Nature of the Constitution, Justice Henry Baldwin
concluded with his concurring opinions in the Court's pro-states'
rights decisions of 1837.235 Writing about the Miln case, Baldwin
observed:
[The states] little thought that in the grant of a power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the states,
they also granted as a means, the regulation of internal police;
they little feared that the powers which were cautiously reserved
to themselves by an amendment, could be taken from them by
construction.... [Tihe tenth amendment becomes a dead letter if
the constitution does not point to the powers which are "dele-
gated to the United States," or "prohibited to the states," and
reserve all other powers "to the states respectively or to the
people."'
To Baldwin, the Tenth Amendment risked becoming an empty
promise unless the Court limited the construction of federal
power.31 In this, Baldwin echoed the warnings of the state ratifica-
tion conventions, the speeches of Madison, and the writings of St.
George Tucker. In his concurring opinion in Miln, Justice Thompson
found such a rule in the Ninth Amendment, and quoted Story's own
words in Houston v. Moore:
[Concurrent state power] is fully recognised by the whole Court,
in the case of Houston v. Moore.... Mr. Justice Story, who also
dissented from the result of the judgment, is still more full and
explicit on this point. The constitution, says he, containing a
grant of powers in many instances similar to those already
existing in the state governments; and some of these being of
vital importance also to state authority and state legislation, it
235. HENRY BALDWIN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION
AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, DEDUCED FROM THE POLITICAL HISTORY AND
CONDITION OF THE COLONIES AND STATES, FROM 1774 UNTIL 1788. AND THE DECISIONS OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. TOGETHER WITH OPINIONS IN THE CASES DECIDED AT
JANUARY TERM, 1837, ARISING ON THE RESTRAINTS ON THE POWERS OF THE STATES (Phila.,
John C. Clark 1837).
236. Id. at 195.
237. Id.
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is not to be admitted that a mere grant of such powers, in
affirmative terms, to congress, does,per se, transfer an exclusive
sovereignty on such subjects to the latter. On the contrary, a
reasonable interpretation of that instrument necessarily leads
to the conclusion that the powers so granted are never exclusive
of similar powers existing in the states; unless [citing excep-
tions].... In all other cases, not falling within the classes already
mentioned, it seems unquestionable that the states retain
concurrent authority with congress; not only upon the letter and
spirit of the eleventh amendment of the constitution, but upon
the soundest principle of reasoning.2"
The Taney Court, thus, restored Tucker's rule of strict construction.
Witnessing the end of Marshall's nationalist interpretation of the
Constitution, Justice Story could only pen dissents and lament in
his letters: "I am the last of the old race of Judges. I stand their
solitary representative, with a pained heart, and a subdued
confidence. Do you remember the story of the last dinner of a club,
who dined once a year? I am in the predicament of the last survi-
vor."
23 9
Cases like Miln and Charles River replaced Marshall's unbridled
construction of federal power with the stricter interpretation sug-
gested by the Ninth Amendment (according to Justice Thompson)
and preserving the principles of the Tenth (according to Justice
Baldwin). Despite a few notable exceptions,2 4 ° the Supreme Court
strictly construed the powers of the federal government for the
remainder of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century
in order to preserve the reserved powers and rights of the states.2 4 '
In the years leading up to the Civil War, both abolitionists242 and
238. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 150-51 (Thompson, J., concurring).
239. Letter from Joseph Story to Harriet Martineau (Apr. 7, 1837), in 2 JOSEPH STORY, LIFE
AND LETERS OF JOSEPH STORY 277 (William W. Story ed., 1851).
240. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842); The Legal Tender Cases, 79
U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
241. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
242. See, e.g., SALMON PORTLAND CHASE, RECLAMATION OF FUGITIVES FROM SERVICE: AN
ARGUMENT FOR THE DEFENDANT SUBMITTED TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
AT THE DECEMBER TERM, 1846, IN THE CASE OF WHARTON JONES VS. JOHN VANZANDT 106
(Books for Libraries Press 1971) (1847) (arguing that the federal Fugitive Slave Act was
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pro-slavery advocates2 43 invoked the principles of strict construction.
Tucker's rule of strict construction emerged unscathed following the
Civil War in an opinion by abolitionist Justice Salmon P. Chase2 "
and became entrenched by the Supreme Court in the Slaughter-
House Cases.245 State and federal courts went on to apply Tucker's
rule for the remainder of the nineteenth century and well into the
twentieth.2 46 Although sometimes cited as a freestanding rule and
other times linked to the Tenth Amendment, countless courts rooted
the rule of strict construction in the texts of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments.247
unconstitutional on the grounds that legislation regarding escaping servants was a matter
reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment). According to Chase, "The provision
[regarding escaped slaves] is, undoubtedly, in restraint of liberty, and it is to be construed
strictly." Id. at 98; see also Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 600-02 (recounting Pennsylvania
Attorney General Ovid F. Johnson's argument that the Ninth and Tenth Amendment call for
a limited reading of federal power that preserves the retained powers of the states).
243. See CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 212-17 (1860) (reporting Judah P. Benjamin's
speech in Congress citing the Ninth and Tenth Amendments in support of slave state
secession).
244. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 614 (1870). In Hepburn, Chief Justice
Chase held that the Tenth Amendment was intended "to restrain the limited government
established under the Constitution from the exercise of powers not clearly delegated or
derived by just inference from powers so delegated." Id. Stretching federal power to conduct
war to include the power to issue legal tender, wrote Chase, "prove[s] too much":
It carries the doctrine of implied powers very far beyond any extent hitherto
given to it. It asserts that whatever in any degree promotes an end within the
scope of a general power, whether, in the correct sense of the word, appropriate
or not, may be done in the exercise of an implied power.
Id. at 617. Chase further rejected the idea that the Constitution leaves it to Congress to
determine whether a particular action is sufficiently related to an enumerated end. According
to Chase:
[This] would convert the government, which the people ordained as a
government of limited powers, into a government of unlimited powers. It would
confuse the boundaries which separate the executive and judicial from the
legislative authority. It would obliterate every criterion which this court,
speaking through the venerated Chief Justice in the case already cited,
established for the determination of the question whether legislative acts are
constitutional or unconstitutional.
Id. at 618.
245. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 36.
246. For a comprehensive look at this case law, see Lash, Lost Jurisprudence, supra note
39.
247. There are many cases. See, e.g., George v. Bailey, 274 F. 639, 640-41 (W.D.N.C. 1921),
rev'd 259 U.S. 16 (1922). For a general discussion of the cases, see Lash, Lost Jurisprudence,
supra note 39. The Supreme Court continued to rely on the Ninth and Tenth Amendments in
support of a rule of strict construction well into the twentieth century. See, e.g., Bute v.
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It was not until the New Deal reduced both the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments to mere "truisms" that the rule of strict construction
lost judicial support.248 But even this modern revival of Marshallian
nationalism proved temporary. Since its decision in United States
v. Lopez, 249 the current Supreme Court has rejected the idea that
federal power has no limits except those expressly listed in the
Constitution. ° This so-called (and perhaps waning)2"' federalism
revolution has as its premise the idea that enumerated federal
power must be construed in a manner that preserves a distinction
between national and local jurisdiction-a distinction enforceable in
federal court as a right of the people.252
CONCLUSION
Despite the prominent place of McCulloch v. Maryland25 and
Gibbons v. Ogden25 4 in constitutional law courses, by the end of the
semester students find themselves studying opinions like United
States v. Morrison255 and Printz v. United States,25 which apply an
interpretive approach more in keeping with St. George Tucker's rule
of strict construction than with the nationalist vision of John
Marshall and Joseph Story. Although federalist strict construction
has been criticized for its lack of textual roots and its undermining
of individual rights, the former criticism is false and the latter is
critically incomplete. Tucker grounded his rule in the texts of the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments and, in doing so, echoed James
Madison's explanation (and application) of those same amendments.
Nor can strict construction be dismissed as nothing but the hand-
maiden of slavery and an obstruction to judicial protection of
Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 650-53 (1948).
248. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) ("[The Tenth] amendment
states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.").
249. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556-57 (1995).
250. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607-08 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 731-35 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 904-33 (1997).
251. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005) (upholding the power of the federal
government to override state laws permitting noncommercial medical use of marijuana).
252. See supra note 30.
253. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
254. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
255. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
256. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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individual rights. True, defenders of slavery and racial segregation
invoked strict construction. But that same rule of interpreta-
tion played a key role in the struggle against the Alien and
Sedition Acts, and later became a central plank in the abolitionist
Republican Party Platform of 1860.257 Although local autonomy may
limit federal power to pass legislation like The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act 58 and the Violence Against Women Act, 259 a
vigorous application of the same rule would protect the right of
California citizens to authorize medicinal use of marijuana 2' and
the right of Oregon residents to authorize physician assisted suicide.
In all these cases, the rule supports the same principle: Strict
construction of federal power preserves the people's retained right
to control certain matters at a local level. It protects the political
right to local self-government. As St. George Tucker reminded us
long ago, this dispersed delegation of power flows from the people's
sovereign right to structure their government as they see fit.
Although one can debate the normative value of federalism, or the
effect of constitutional amendments on the federalist nature of the
original compact,261 Professor Tucker reminds us that one can
257. According to Garrett Epps,
Lincoln was not unusual among Republicans in expressing fear for free-state
sovereignty against the federalized Slave Power behemoth. William E. Gienapp
notes that Gideon Welles, a prominent Connecticut Democrat who became a
Republican stalwart and later a member of Lincoln's Cabinet, abandoned his
original party out of "states' rights conservatism" in 1856, and proclaimed that
Republicans must stand for "the rights of man, the rights of the state, a strict
construction of the constitution, opposition to the nationality and extension of
slavery, and to the aggressive measures and unauthorized assumption of powers
by the federal government." The Republican Party's national platform in 1860
demanded that "the Federal Constitution, the Rights of the States, and the
Union of the States, must and shall be preserved." The platform went on to
guarantee "the maintenance, inviolate, of the Rights of the States, and especially
of the right of each State to order and control its own domestic institutions
according to its own judgment exclusively."
Garrett Epps, The Antebellum Political Background of the Fourteenth Amendment, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. Summer 2004, at 175, 199-200 (quoting WILLIAM E. GIENAPP, THE ORIGINS
OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1852-1866, at 276 n.10 (1982); National Republican Platform,
Adopted by the Chicago Convention (May 17, 1860), in 2 THE AMERICAN PARTY BATTLE,
ELECTION CAMPAIGN PAMPHLETS, 1826-1876, at 121-22 (Joel H. Silvey ed., 1999)).
258. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
259. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598.
260. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Gonzales v.
Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
261. Professors Michael Kent Curtis and Akhil Amar have both done important work
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embrace federalism without sacrificing a broad vision of personal
freedom.262 The ideal of local self-government is attractive to any
localized political movement, a fact that probably explains the
longevity of the rule of strict construction. This rule-Tucker's
rule-survived the Adams administration, the Marshall Court, the
Civil War, and the New Deal."' This is a remarkable feat and a
testament to the prescient wisdom of Professor Tucker.
suggesting a restructuring of the original (federalist) Bill of Rights which occurred through
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
CREATIONAND RECONSTRUCTION (1998); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S
DARLING PRIVILEGE": STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 357-83
(2000); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986).
262. See Tucker, On the State of Slavery in Virginia, in 2 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES, supra note 45, ed. app. at 31-85.
263. Reconciling the Ninth Amendment and the New Deal requires a constitutional theory
of the New Deal, as well as a theory of stare decisis to the degree that New Deal landmark
cases like Wickard v. Pilburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), are in tension with the restrictions of the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments. Bruce Ackerman has done important theoretical work on the
New Deal, see 2 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1998), but beyond his efforts, there
remains a dearth of constitutional analysis regarding how to reconcile the New Deal with the
economic rights of Reconstruction, much less with the federalism constraints of the Founding.
But see Kurt T. Lash, The Constitutional Convention of 1937: The Original Meaning of the
New Jurisprudential Deal, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 459 (2001).

